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Abstract. This paper presents a proposal for scalable detection and iso-
lation of phishing. The main ideas are to move the protection from end
users towards the network provider and to employ the novel bad neigh-
bourhood concept, in order to detect and isolate both phishing e-mail
senders and phishing web servers. In addition, we propose to develop
a self-management architecture that enables ISPs to protect their users
against phishing attacks, and explain how this architecture could be eval-
uated. This proposal is the result of half a year of research work at the
University of Twente (UT), and it is aimed at a Ph.D. thesis in 2012.
1 Introduction
With the rapid growth of services like e-business and electronic banking, phishing
is quickly becoming one of the main security threats for the Internet. In recent
years we have witnessed a shift from incidents, towards a well organized crim-
inal phishing “industry”. Despite of the fact that the real direct losses (money
stolen from users) caused by phishing is still unknown – since usually banks and
companies do not disclose this information – some estimates indicate that these
losses could, in the United States, be between $ 61 million [1] and $ 3.2 billion [2]
per year. In addition, phishing also inflicts indirect costs (e.g., costs associated
to the staff to deal with it, network and computer resources) and compromises
the trust of Internet users in e-mail and the web [1].
In order to fight phishing, several approaches have been proposed in the last
few years. These approaches can be categorized into two major areas: (i) the
“human factor” and (ii) techniques and algorithms to detect phishing. The for-
mer comprises social and psychological studies, the design of user interfaces,
and the education of users and providers [3,4]. The latter presents different ap-
proaches to protect the user against phishing. Since phishing attacks usually
consist of two phases (distribution of malicious URLs via spam, and connecting
to malicious URLs by victims), there are proposals that focus specifically on
detecting phishing e-mail [5] and others that focus on blocking the access to
spoofed URLs. In relation to these, most of the approaches are client-centric,
i.e., they require software installed at the client side (e.g., a browser extension
module [6,7,8]) and often rely on Content Black Lists (CBLs) for finding sus-
picious words. Commercial solutions also exist; the Cyveillance Anti-phishing
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[9] has developed a proprietary Internet monitoring technology that claims to
identify activities associated to phishing, such as suspicious domain registrations
and spoofed web sites.
Despite all these efforts, a Gartner survey shows that phishing attacks num-
bers are, in fact, increasing [2]. We consider that this is mainly because current
approaches present limitations such as: (i) Internet Service Providers (ISPs) are
not directly involved (which means that anti-phishing approaches rely on end
users no longer using outdated software), (ii) lack of scalability (detection of
phishing messages puts a heavy load on mail servers), (iii) lack of automation
(maintenance of blacklists is cumbersome), and (iv) non-persistent IP addresses
(current approaches have problems dealing with the dynamics of botnets). In
this paper we introduce an approach to address these limitations. The reminder
of this paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 the approach is explained, in
Section 3 the envisioned architecture is described – and how it can be evaluated
– and conclusions are presented in Section 4.
2 Approach
To address the limitations of the current proposals, we present an approach that
provides a scalable and automated framework to protect users against phishing
attacks. The main ideas behind this approach are:
Move protection to the network: Instead of relying on end users, we pro-
pose to move protection towards the ISP, who should block malicious servers
(by updating rules at firewalls and routers) and, in this way, offer transparent
protection for all end users. ISPs could offer this as a service, in the same way
as British Telecom’s Managed Security Services are offered to enterprises [10].
Analysis of flows: To ensure scalability, we propose the use of flow analysis
instead of deep packet inspection. Moreover, with flow based approaches it is
possible to analyze flow patterns and compare the network behaviour of multi-
ple sources.
Self-management: The high number of phishing attempts makes it impossible
to manually cope with such attempts. Complete automation is desired to make
detection and isolation fast and reliable. The idea is to develop an integrated
architecture that is able to detect and block phishing. More details about the
architecture are described in Section 3.
Bad neighbourhood concept: To cope with botnets and non-persistent IP
addresses, we propose the novel bad neighbourhood concept. The idea behind
bad neighbourhoods, is that the likelihood a certain IP address behaves badly,
increases if neighbour IP addresses (systems within the same subnetwork) be-
have badly. The assumption is that we can distinguish between well managed
subnetworks, in which the probability of misbehaviour is very small, and badly
managed networks, in which the probability of misbehaviour is quite high. Bots
will primarily be found in the later kind of networks. For example, Figure 1
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Fig. 1. Visualization of bad neighborhoods for spam senders (2008-11-01)
clearly shows that spam senders present this pattern, highlighting which subnet-
works generate most spam. This picture was developed using different network
blacklists. An algorithm took the blacklists data as input, and generated as out-
put a Network Black List (NBL) score. Each point in the figure represents the
NBL score for a subnet level of /24, using a Hilbert space filling curve [11]. We
believe that many phishing e-mail senders and phishing web servers can also be
found in bad neighbourhoods. This would provide us with statistical guidelines
on the trustworthiness of neighbours (same subnetwork) IP addresses, which
could be used as input to anomaly detection techniques in order to mitigate
phishing attempts.
3 Architecture and Evaluation
To prove the concept and technical feasibility of our proposal, we will develop a
self-management architecture for phishing detection and isolation. This architec-
ture includes several elements, namely: e-mail servers, network routers, network
firewalls, telescopes (specific kinds of honeypots, distributed all over the network,
to capture and detect phishing messages), phishing e-mail senders, phishing web
servers, and a phishing detector.
The architecture will be evaluated by building prototypes of key components.
Data from real networks (like Ge´ant, Surfnet and/or UT) will be used, such as
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network flows and telescopes logs. Next, the idea is to analyze the data using
self-learning techniques and the bad neighbourhood concept. This will result into
two different lists. The first one contains IP addresses that distribute phishing
messages, while the second contains names and IP addresses of phishing web
servers. The first list could be used as input to mail servers for detection and
removal of phishing messages. The second list could be used as input for network
routers and firewalls, to block users from malicious web servers. In is important
that both lists are maintained and employed in an automated way.
4 Conclusions
Phishing is a important problem that, despite all efforts, still causes significant
monetary losses. In this research we propose to develop and evaluate an archi-
tecture to detect and isolate machines associated to phishing activities. A novel
element in this architecture is the bad neighbourhood concept, of which the
merits will be further investigated as part of this Ph.D. research. This paper
was supported by the EC IST-EMANICS Network of Excellence (#26854). We
would like to thank Ward van Wanrooij for his ideas on the bad neighbourhood
concept and for providing Figure 1.
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